Justice and the Legal Profession by Martin, Clarence E.
Volume 37 
Issue 4 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 37, 
1932-1933 
6-1-1933 
Justice and the Legal Profession 
Clarence E. Martin 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra 
Recommended Citation 
Clarence E. Martin, Justice and the Legal Profession, 37 DICK. L. REV. 223 (1933). 
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol37/iss4/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more 
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu. 
Dickinson Law Review
Volume XXXVII JUNE, 1933 Number 4
*JUSTICE AND THE LEGAL
PROFESSION
Certainly it is a pleasure to be with you, to-day. Not
alone the community, but Dickinson. has a back-ground
full of traditions that fill the heart with warmth and satis-
faction. Yours is a generous heritage. And as you go
forth from these classic halls be assured that the recom-
mendation given you by your college is an eminently
respectable one. Dickinson has furnished to the country
many eminent men. and as the years roll on you will
appreciate. fuller than you do now probably, the great debt
America owes to your alma mater.
There was probably some moving reason that induced
you to undertake the study of the law. It may be that you
were influenced by some great forensic battle you saw or
read about in the legal forum. Perhaps some other equally
enticing inducement controlled your mental action. If your
action was influenced by a desire for or expectation of great
monetary reward, you are likely to be disappointed: for
there is a respectable saying that successful lawyers work
hard, live well and die poor.
If you intend to turn your mind inward, as many do,
and regard the profession as the step towards your own
exploitation and advancement, you will be likewise dis-
appointed. For the law is a jealous mistress and permits
no rivals, such as political preferment. If the latter is an
incident and is a duty performed that all of us owe to the
*An address delivered before the students of the Dickinson School
of Law, April 22, 1933.
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commonwealth, then, if it be in line with your professional
work, the honor alone is your compensation.
If you seek to discover the place of the law in the
social order and link your professional work to the larger
end of the social good, keeping in mind always the higher
thought that yours is a public profession, whose traditions
are noble, whose ends are the administration of concrete
justice, whose ethics are inexorable, then your professional
life, whatever your ultimate status, will be a reward in itselt
and commend you and your family to the most favorable
consideration of the community of which you are a part.
Remember always that your moral conduct will be re-
garded more highly by the public than your professional
ability; that deviation from your code of ethics is dishonor-
able; and that the community in which you live must first
respect you before they honor you. Honor in the legal
profession is grudgingly granted; it is not accidental or
fleeting and is acquired and held because of long and weary
years of almost monastic training and constant study and a
strict regard for the moral standards of the community of
which you are a part.
Your training here, of necessity, is merely a skeleton
one. It is given in such a form as to lay the foundation
for admission to the bar. Once admitted your work on
broader lines begins. Much of it will have no connection
with the particular professional duty of the moment. You
will, I hope, begin then the study of the history of the law,
the reasons for its existence and its philosophy. If you do
not, then your work will be parrot-like; you will be merely
reciting what others tell you is the law, instead of develop-
ing and applying your thoughts to the experience of the
ages. Then you will be better able to test and ascertain the
justice of your cause. Justice, concrete and absolute,
should be always the aim and hope of the lawyer.
Many of you may not be what the world denominates
successful advocates and yet you may find your place as
eminent counselors. Time alone will be the determining
factor. But whatever you are, wherever your lot is cast,
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do your duty honestly and without fear of results or ex-
pectation of favor.
You must have a properly educated and balanced civic
conscience, an ultimate and complete knowledge of the
ethical duties of the lawyer towards the public and towards
his client. If you are lacking in this primary and most
essential trait, your professional life will be a failure.
Keep always in mind the fact that your predecessors in the
profession look to you to maintain unsullied the high and
noble traditions of the centuries. For you are the judges,
the legislators, the diplomats, the presidents-aye, our lead-
ers of to-morrow.
When you come to consider law as a science, unless
you are strong minded and well trained, you will find your-
self in an impenetrable forest of apparently conflicting
ideas and notions. It is well to keep uppermost in your
mind the fundamental idea that laws are made for and by
men and for their government and not men for laws. And
here begins what we call the paradoxes of legal science.
As an eminent professor of Columbia recently said:
"Society moulds and makes the individual; but individuals
are and mould society. Law is a going whole we are born
into; but law is a changing something we help remodel.
Law decides cases; but cases make law. Law deflects
society; but society is reflected in the law. How can such
propositions, patently all true, all so commonplace that we
do not think them through, exist together? How and
where do the gears of the seemingly insights mesh? The
problem before us is description. It is to see, in action, to
follow in their inter-action, the divergent branches of the
paradox; to see them in action as a going whole".
And while the law is a collection of paradoxes, and
thrives upon them, if one may so use the expression, yet its
certainty in application lies in the fact that all law is adjec-
tive in that it strives to be the hand maiden of justice, and
is but the force, when put in motion, that is presumed to
ascertain and apply justice to the individual. May .1
illustrate it? Take an automobile. The ultimate purpose
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is its use, whether for passenger or freight. Many differ-
ent materials are required in its building, innumerable parts
are made, a design or pattern is carefully followed, num-
erous mechanics are employed in the actual building of it,
other agencies such as steam or electricity and other
machinery, are required, which bring into play so many
various and different actions that the human mind can
hardly conceive of them. Then the bowels of the earth
are searched for oil, which is refined into two different ways
for fuel, and water is added. The machine is complete.
The iron, which was converted into steel, the wood used
for its wheels or body, were centuries in the making-
nature contributed. The mind of man collected all these
things and put them together. But without the driver at'
the wheel, to properly direct its motions, it is without force.
When the human mind starts the machine and it moves
towards its ultimate object-then all of the various mater-
ials, the work of the ages, the minds of hundreds of other
men on the manufacture of its parts, are given force and
effect. The object is attained. So with the law-the end
is justice.
Yet, if defects exist or parts are lacking, as the
machine refuses to function or does so imperfectly-so with
the law. Justice, the objective end, is lacking.
When the legal machine works perfectly, when the
gears mesh, when the machine responds, all the rules -of
law, centuries maybe in the making, are applied, the mind
of the driver directing its movement is the Infinite, the
philosopher's First Great Cause, the God of Mankind-
and Justice, its ultimate goal, is attained.
For that reason, if I may now bring your minds back
to the present, material problems, we frequently ask our-
selves in this present age, in view of the complexities of
our problems, whether the civilization of the centuries,
which has made the many rules of law, striving together to
work out ultimate justice, shall endure and whether we are
strong enough to face the future confident that the basic
concepts of justice, upon which we have and are building
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that civilization, will stand the strain and advance to the
ultimate triumph of truth. For justice, we know, must be
and is truth personified.
Then, to, into this maelstrom of conflicting thought has
come the constant and recurring charge that the law is not
adequately adjusting itself to these changes of economic
thought and social conditions, and, where there is adequate
adjustment, in many cases, the adjective field is too re-
stricted to give either complete, effective or early relief.
And for these existent shortcomings, the legal profession is
held responsible. One would acquire the impression that
we are a class distinct and apart from the social atmosphere
in which we live, without knowledge of its extent and un-
affected by it,
It may become your duty to answer this charge. It
is undoubtedly true as you have ascertained that the
adjective or procedural field of the law needs overhauling,
and needs it badly. But the charge made, as applied to the
legal profession, is unfounded. Time and again, in every
manner in which the bar can speak, the bar has called the
attention of the legislative departments of the nation and
states to the woeful condition of legal procedure. It has
urgently pleaded for relief from complicated systems of
pleading, from delays, and from rules of procedure govern-
ing appeals. And most of its pleas have been in vain. A
single printed page, giving the appellate courts the power to
make procedural rules and change them, as and when
necessary, will place the responsibility on the bar for re-
form in the field of adjective law. Until this is done, there
will be no real relief. Why the legislative branch of our
governments refuses to give to our courts the rule making
power, as the English Parliament has done, is beyond the
ken of man. The legislatures have not hesitated to give
to administrative boards, such as public service commis-
sions, the right to make procedural rules and even to hear
cases without resort to the common rules of evidence-but
to the courts, never! Urge, then, as one of the reforms in
the law, that the rule making power, which includes the
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entire procedural field, be lodged in the hands of the courts,
where it belongs, and within a relatively short period of
time the people will hear no more about the law's delay in
civil matters. When we come to the substantive portion
of the law-the body of the law, so-called, a different con-
dition prevails. Those who hold the legal profession re-
sponsible for the shortcomings of the body of the law, as
distinguished from its procedure, have little regard for or
knowledge of the science or technique of the law. The
substantive law is confined to the common and the statute
law. The necessity for substantive law, either common or
statute law, awaits the existence of a right before the
creation of the concept. We know that if the existence of
a right is not challenged, then no reason exists for any rule.
But these well meaning critics of our profession conceive
the idea that we may, if we will, without legislative sanc-
tion, breathe into the common law economic thought or take
judicial notice of a social condition, and that when the pro-
fession fails to do what the legislative branch has not done,
there is a lack of comprehension on our part. If one
would project into the law an economic principle or some
new thought, new or undefined, without sufficient force to
become a general and accepted theory governing some
particular transaction or business, it should be done by
legislation and not by court action. Then the thought be-
comes part of the substantive law and the only question
remaining is whether such economic thought, translated
into positive law, conforms with constitutional provisions.
In the adoption of a new idea, the trouble lies in de-
termining what is the prevailing economic thought or social
condition. Courts, indeed, take judicial cognizance, so
distinguished from judicial notice, of some prevailing con-
dition, generally recognized, which is reflected from the
facts. It is in this manner that custom creeps into and be-
comes part of the body of the common law. On the other
hand, to assert that courts may go without the record of the
particular case and by reference to some expression of an
economist or any declaration of layman or lawyer of what
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is or should be a legal rule and make it one-and I admit
that this has happened, is to advocate a rule which would
violate the very foundation of the judicial process. Let us
not forget that the courts apply legal rules only to concrete
facts.
Social facts or social conditions cannot so easily be-
come part of the body of the common law. The common
law is of slow, almost imperceptible, growth-too slow to
assimilate proposed drastic action that so often we have
been importuned to adopt. A rule of law is based upon
logic, history, custom and utility, as well as the accepted
standards of right conduct, which, says Mr. justice Cor-
dozo, "singly or in combination shape the progress of the
law". And to quote him further, he remarks: "One of
the fundamental social interests is that the law shall be
uniform and impartial. Therefore, in the main, there shall
be adherence to precedent".
We, who are advocates in the legal forums, hesitate
to suggest, much less to urge, any completely new idea, It
is only when precedent is out of gear, when it is plainly
wrong and completely at variance with fundamental truth,
as applied to the subject matter in controversy, that we
desire to propose a new rule of decision.
The courts, too, have an inherent hesitancy, born of
wisdom, of constructing new paths along well defined
avenues of thought. Certainly they have tried to make
the crooked road straight, to cut down the hills, to level up
the depressions. That is their function. But let it be
noted that they have been as careful as the courts of yonder
years to ascertain that the slopes and banks of public wel-
fare on either side of the road are properly constructed
and sufficiently strong to stand the strain.
True every generation contributes some thought of
material value to the sum total of human intelligence, and
it may be that history will accord to this age more substan-
tial contributions than other periods of time; but to suggest
that society take into consideration each and every social
whim, every ill conceived formula, and weigh it for in-
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clusion into the substance of the common law, is to ask the
judiciary to exchange the fleeting conceit of the times for
the experience of ages, and, by it ipse dixit, to create con-
ceptions that may weigh down and destroy the whole
fabric of the body of the law.
These well meaning advocates of social reform, many
of them charged with a self imposed duty, with superficial
knowledge or none at all, of the subject, would substitute
sentimental emotionalism for the realm of reason; the
courts of Momus for the tribunals of justice. It is time to
speak.
That defects exist in the body of the law, as well as in
its adjective principles, is undoubtedly true, and this condi-
tion will continue until the end of time. Our object and
purpose is to reduce them to a minimum. For law is an
expression of the law giver, whether the autocrat or a free
and independent people. It is the result, the supposed sum
total of human experience and intelligence at the time of
adoption.
Nor can it be said that, apart from our purely profes-
sional duties, during this present so-called upheaval in
social thought, we have been lagging. In every avenue of
human endeavor the bar has been laboring. Every state
and local bar association is attempting a solution of its
problems. Through the Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, the profession has formulated and
recommended the passage of statutes by the States making
uniform in form and construction, the law pertaining to
the various branches of commercial transactions-some of
which have been adopted by every State of our Union.
The newly organized American Legislators Association,
the work of lawyers interested in legislation, is seeking
to inculcate proper perceptions and to generate uniform
methods in that realm of action. The American Judicature
Society is attacking the problem of simplification of the
judicial structure. The American Law Institute is gradu-
ally bringing order out of seeming chaos in the unwritten
law and the result of its work is even now being felt in the
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judicial realm. Every section and committee of the Amer-
ican Bar Association is charged with the performance of
some duty, the favorable termination of which duty, it is
hoped, will contribute to the cause of justice. In short, we
are not alone restating the law-we are recodifying it, if
I may so express it. The accomplishment of these under-
takings, coordinative in purpose and conceived to meet the
demand of the times, have the support and encouragement
of the American Bar Association. Each of them is building
for the present and preparing for the future. Collectively,
they are the work of a unified bar, conscious now of its
established influence and its force in the body politic. Thus
have we turned seeming forlorn hope into constructive
action! May we not indulge the expectation that succeed-
ing generations will proclaim this era the golden age of
American jurisprudence?
We brought to our shores the substantive law and the
adjective principles embodied in the common law of Eng-
land, crude in many respects and unsuited in others for the
development of a mighty nation. This system, added to
and subtracted from, has been molded by the American
courts to suit the necessities of an heterogeneous people.
So far it has been welded to meet not alone the demands of
an agricultural people, for which it was intended, but it has
been enlarged and extended, in a constructive manner, to
suit the requirements of a great" industrial people, into
which we have grown. Nursed and cradled in the age of
the cradle, its principles have been made applicable to an
age of electricity. Under its protecting shield we have
travelled from the time of the stage coach to that of the
aeroplane. That system, builded now into a body of
American law, has been the greatest contributing, aye, the
controlling factor in the maintenance of peace and the
political solidification of our people.
Notwithstanding the recurring attacks from well mean-
ing as well as disgruntled groups, time after time, and
sometimes from convulsive actions within their own ranks,
our courts, as far as the judicial process will permit, have
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held fast to the fundamental concepts of justice in accord
with the precepts of the natural law. Mistakes they have
made and plenty of them: but they have fallen to rise, to
conceive nobler objectives. They have been ambitious
only in the cause of right.
They have, by their foresight and learning, breathed
into our constitutional structure the life of legal beauty,
nurtured it and sustained it, so that it has grown with the
nation, gathering strength and wisdom, until it has become
the admired political creature of the civilized world. And
above all things, our judiciary, as a body, has sought the
truth and, as occasion demanded, fearlessly declared it-
the noblest gift of God.
This, then, in brief, has been our record; and upon
this muniment of things accomplished, we have builded our
destiny. Call us reactionary, if one will, but it has been a
reaction based upon constructive conservatism. Accuse
use of lack of appreciation of the social atmosphere, as the
unthinking do, yet it is and we hope always will be a want
born of a desire to be certain of our philosophy. We have
opened wide the throttle to so-called progressive thought
only when we knew that adequate terminal facilities had
been provided, and we have observed well the guiding
signals the centuries have erected along our path for the
safety of our people.
Certainly the American bench and bar of this genera-
tion needs no commendation. Sufficient, indeed, is it to
say that amid the vicissitudes and fortunes of our political
life for a century and a half, members of the bar have been
the leaders of constructive thought and action in the nation.
To you, then, who are about to consecrate your lives to
the service of the profession there should come an in-
dividual sense of responsibility that law shall be just and
that it shall be administered honestly, fairly and quickly.
Emerging, as we trust we are, from the turmoil and unrest,
the troubles and the tribulations, of the last third of a cen-
tury, we look to you, the lawyers of yonder years, to pro-
tect that structure which has been builded now into a
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system of law, dedicatcd to the cause of justice, which, in
the aggregate, will secure the admiration and meet the ap-
probation of our posterity. What you should strive for
in your professional life is the creation of an enlightened,
cordial and encouraging sentiment among our people, who
have knowledge of our past, who are conscious, as we are,
of our shortcomings, and who are sympathetic with our
aims and ideals to perpetuate a system that has been the
basis of our American civilization.
Martinsburg, W. Va. CLARENCE E. MARTIN.
